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Many attempts have been made to formalise ethical requirements for research. Among the most prominent 
mechanisms are informed consent requirements and data protection regimes. These mechanisms, however, 
sometimes appear as obstacles to research. In this opinion paper, we critically discuss conventional approaches to 
research ethics that emphasise consent and data protection. Several recent debates have highlighted other important 
ethical issues and underlined the need for greater openness in order to uphold the integrity of health-related 
research. Some of these measures, such as the sharing of individual-level data, pose problems for standard 
understandings of consent and privacy. Here, we argue that these interpretations tend to be over-demanding: they 
do not really protect research subjects and they hinder the research process. Accordingly, we suggest another way 
of framing these requirements. Individual consent must be situated alongside the wider distribution of knowledge 
created when the actions, commitments and procedures of researchers and their institutions are opened to scrutiny. 
And instead of simply emphasising privacy or data protection, we should understand confidentiality as a principle 
that facilitates the sharing of information while upholding important safeguards. Consent and confidentiality 








This paper reconsiders the overarching purpose of informed consent and data protection against the 
background of recent calls for wider data sharing. It proposes an enabling view of consent and 
confidentiality requirements, a view that fits with broader demands for openness and accountability 
across all aspects of the research endeavour.  
Many attempts have been made to formalise ethical requirements for research – for example, the many 
versions of the Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association, 1964, 2013). Among the most 
prominent mechanisms are ethics committees, informed consent requirements, and data protection 
regimes. However, these mechanisms sometimes appear as obstacles to research – for instance, where 
ethics committees or data protection officers ask for lengthy, legalistic informed consent forms or 
impose tight limits on the sharing of data. In addition, the European Commission has proposed the so-
called draft General Data Protection Regulation for Europe (European Commission, 2012). Prompted 
by the massive use of personal data by some online services, this draft regulation would also have 
prohibited the use of existing pseudonymised data for research purposes without informed consent. 
Researchers across Europe have launched many petitions to amend this regulation, and revisions have 
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been under discussion in the so-called trialogue of the European Commission, Parliament and Council. 
The new regulation is expected to come into force in 2016.  
Over the past few decades, however, it has become clear that there are many other ethical issues 
affecting much health-related research (e.g. Altman, 1994; Ioannidis, 2005). A brief list would include 
the following.  
(1) In some areas, there is considerable duplication of research leading to avoidable redundancy 
(Chalmers, 2005; Habre et al., 2014). Researchers need to exploit the research efforts that have already 
been made – for instance, by conducting systematic reviews to consolidate knowledge before 
commencing another study, e.g. in form of Cochrane reviews (Chalmers et al., 1992), or by ensuring 
that existing datasets are fully exploited.  
(2) In all areas, there is a great deal of research that is ill-designed to answer the questions it is 
supposed to address. A study may be underpowered, for example, so that there is no possibility of 
statistically valid findings (Altman, 1980; Halpern et al., 2002).  
(3) A third serious problem concerns forms of bias that may impact on the validity of study findings 
(see for instance the landmark paper by Sackett, 1979; Delgado-Rodríguez and Llorca, 2004). Such 
bias may occur in formulating specific research questions, research design, statistical analysis and 
reporting (Chan et al., 2004; Kirkham et al., 2010; Saini et al., 2014). Poor statistical analysis can arise 
in the form of inadequate models, or failure to consider confounding factors, or failure to distinguish 
associations from causes, or ignoring multiplicity in statistical testing (e.g. Gigerenzer, 2004). There is 
also considerable bias in research publication – for example, well-known patterns of under- and over-
publication (McGauran et al., 2010; Jones et al., 2013; Dwan et al., 2013; Page et al., 2014) create bias 
by the relative absence of negative results and waste study participants’ time and energies (Lehman and 
Loder, 2012). – As the CIOMS International Ethical Guidelines point out, “scientifically unsound 
research… is ipso facto unethical” (CIOMS, 2002). 
At the broadest level, the overarching remedy for these problems is to ensure greater openness and 
accountability throughout the research process. To avoid many forms of bias, we need to open each 
step of this process to greater scrutiny, so that researchers can be fully accountable for the knowledge 
claims they put forward. Importantly, such openness is not just a matter of ensuring that research 
proposals are appropriate or sharing trial protocols or ensuring final publication. More radically, it also 
requires the sharing of participant-level data with other scientific teams, so that methods and analyses 
can be checked in full detail. More researchers need to explore and analyse the complex datasets built 
up in clinical trials and larger investigations, in order that published results can be replicated or 
replaced with more valid ones (Ioannidis et al., 2009; Baggerly, 2010; Gøtzsche, 2011). Unless 
individual-level data are opened to other researchers, we can expect continuing, irresolvable problems 
of bias, distortion and error (Ross et al., 2012; Chalmers et al., 2013; Chan et al., 2014). The question 
now is not whether but how data are to be shared, while preventing abuses of data, upholding 
confidentiality, and doing justice to the legitimate claims of research subjects, scientists and sponsoring 
institutions (for discussion see Neutra et al., 2006; The Royal Society, 2012; Berlin et al., 2014; 
Ioannidis et al., 2014; Koenig et al., 2015).  
As discussed shortly, such data-sharing appears ethically problematic given the conventional framing 
of research ethics. However, this troubling appearance is deceptive. If we understand consent and 
privacy requirements as part of wider efforts to ensure accountability and responsibility throughout the 
Biometrical Journal xx (2016) xx 
 
 
© 2010 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim                               www.biometrical-journal.com 
research process, it becomes obvious that they need to be situated alongside other mechanisms, and that 
it is misguided to insist on highly demanding attempts to realise them.  
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we spell out why ‘informed consent’ and ‘data 
protection’ imply tensions for research ethics, as conventionally understood. In Sections 3 and 4 we ask 
why consent and privacy matter. In both cases, we argue that understanding this can help show how to 
respect the underlying values in the face of the tensions discussed in Section 2. Section 5 spells out our 
overarching argument: by situating consent and confidentiality within a broader framework for research 
accountability, these principles can be interpreted in ways that support rather than hinder the research 
process. 
2 Two tensions for research ethics 
Having briefly introduced this background of broader ethical problems for research, and the need for 
greater openness regarding many steps of the research process, we now focus on questions of consent 
and confidentiality. In particular, we will point out that both imply tensions for research ethics. 
2.1 Informed consent 
The most obvious tension is already contained in the term ‘informed consent’. Consent “means any 
freely given specific, informed and explicit indication of [the subject’s] wishes,” says the Draft General 
Data Protection Regulation (European Commission, 2012, Art. 4, §8). While many argue that 
(informed) consent is not always necessary for research that does not require the active involvement of 
research subjects (Parker, 2005; Miller, 2008) – for example, research that relies on data already 
gathered for other purposes – the default position remains an insistence on informed consent. Thinking 
again of current EU data protection proposals, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs (LIBE Committee) proposes that data should only be reused for research, without consent, 
where “high public interest” (LIBE Committee 2013: Amendment 86) in the research has been 
demonstrated. Such a vague and demanding formulation, however, leaves room for subjective 
decisions by data protection officers that may hinder sound research.  
Beyond the specific problems posed by insisting on consent, there is a broader difficulty. Even where it 
is sought, consent cannot be fully informed. Attempts to fully inform the study participants are doomed 
because there is always more information that could be given and a limit to how much information 
people can digest. In practice, therefore, this ambition results in over-detailed, uninformative consent 
materials. In order to inform, information has to be relevant and appropriate to its audience (O’Neill, 
2002, p. 154-160; Manson and O’Neill, 2007, p. 84-90). This requires framing (that is, putting things 
one way rather than another) and selectivity (that is, the omission of detail so that the broad outlines 
appear clearly). It is never possible to frame matters in a way that permits no alternative construction. 
Sometimes it is possible to supply nearly every detail, where a study aims to answer a highly specific 
question using a well-known methodology – for example, a randomised controlled trial concerning the 
efficacy of an already well-examined drug. In many others cases – large-scale epidemiological 
research, for example – such information is simply unavailable in advance. Researchers can only 
inform participants in broad terms because they cannot fully anticipate the analyses that may be 
possible. Moreover, as we emphasised in our introduction, if a dataset is to be fully exploited and initial 
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conclusions properly scrutinised, other researchers must be able to interrogate the data, often in ways 
that cannot be foreseen. 
2.2 Confidentiality  
A second tension is inherent in the idea of confidentiality. Confidentiality requirements are often 
framed in terms of data protection and privacy. Yet the research process relies on individual-level data 
being shared. Clearly, this tension is greatly heightened by the demands of research on ever-larger 
cohorts and the demands for openness, scrutiny and accountability that become clear on a wider view 
of research ethics. Proper peer scrutiny of research claims requires sharing individual-level data beyond 
the original research team. Doing so raises many difficult practical questions that we will not address 
here – for example, (1) how long should the original researchers have exclusive access to ‘their’ data; 
(2) in what ways can ill-founded modes of analysis, such as dredging for statistically significant 
associations, be prevented; (3) how can complex clinical or epidemiological data be properly analysed 
by researchers who lack the background knowledge of those who built up the dataset; and (4) how 
should authorship be dealt with? But we do want to emphasise the basic point. In order to permit 
reanalysis and to make the best use of research subjects’ contributions, data must be available to many 
different research teams. Moreover, individual consent is not a meaningful or practicable way to 
authorise such data-sharing (Solove, 2013). 
2.3 Apparent trade-offs of informed consent and confidentiality 
At first glance, these tensions may look like practical dilemmas that require regrettable trade-offs. In 
the case of ‘informed consent’, the trade-off would be between valid consent and possible, practical 
consent. On this view, actual consent would always lack some validity insofar as the study participant 
is not fully knowledgeable about the ways in which his/her contribution will be used. In the case of 
privacy, the trade-off would be even clearer: Either we accept the status quo ante, whereby most 
research findings have to be considered with considerable caution (Ioannidis, 2005), since other 
researchers cannot scrutinise the data underlying published claims. Or we sacrifice privacy in the 
pursuit of a more valid research process. Such views see an irresolvable conflict between ‘ethics’ and 
‘research’. 
In order to overcome these dilemmas, various strategies have been tried. With regard to consent, we 
have already mentioned obvious difficulties in attempts to provide ever-more comprehensive 
information to research subjects. A potentially more interesting strategy is the development of 
“dynamic consent technologies” (Kaye et al., 2015). A person supplies biosamples and health care 
information, which can be used for many different sorts of research. He/she is offered, probably 
through an on-line interface, the opportunity to consent to or refuse each distinct proposal to use her/his 
sample and data. Such a model may be workable for particular types of research, but it carries 
considerable costs. If study participants become unwilling to continually digest information on planned 
studies – which is not the same thing as refusing consent to the studies themselves – then their data and 
samples will be lost. Pursued systematically, dynamic consent technologies would either over-inform, 
becoming unmanageable for study participants, or overuse consent, presumably reducing it to a mere 
ritual of on-line box-ticking. Although appealing at first glance, they cannot offer a general solution to 
the supposed trade-off between valid consent and broader or unanticipated uses of data or samples. 
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With regard to privacy, many researchers have hoped that anonymising biological samples and health 
data would solve this problem and even remove the need for consent – thus the well-known imperative 
of ‘consent or anonymise.’ (By anonymisation, we mean the removal of both personal identifying 
information and of any pseudonym or code that links back to individual identities.) From the start, it 
has been clear that anonymising data makes it impossible to update it at the individual level, leaving the 
dataset fixed at a single point in time and thus making longitudinal studies impossible. Yet longitudinal 
studies are the only way to understand the development of diseases over the life-course and the causal 
impact of various risk factors. 
Furthermore, it is now widely recognised that truly anonymising any informative, individual-level 
dataset is not possible (Ohm, 2010; Rothstein, 2010). Illnesses and medical interventions are key life 
events; for any individual, the pattern in which they fall is as unique as a genetic sample or fingerprint. 
Together, ever-greater computing power, publically available clues, and linkage with other datasets 
increasingly permit reidentification of individuals – however unethical this may be. As with dynamic 
consent technologies, our point is not that anonymisation is always undesirable: in many cases it helps 
provide important protection to research subjects. Nevertheless, anonymisation is not always 
appropriate, and by itself cannot overcome the apparent trade-off between privacy and data-sharing. 
2.4 Ways to mediate or overcome these trade-offs 
Conceptually and ethically, we therefore need to reconsider the values we are seeking to uphold: Why 
does consent matter and in what ways should it be ‘informed’? Why does privacy matter and how 
should it relate to confidentiality and research? We will point out that common assumptions about 
consent and privacy make these tensions seem tighter than need be. However, these assumptions are 
not simple mistakes, and this raises a second set of questions. 
Practically and institutionally, we need to ask what roles and responsibilities can enable us to address 
these tensions and mediate between them. In the case of the tension between information and consent, 
scientific and institutional openness represents a way to bridge the tension between over-detailed, 
incomprehensible, not-yet-available information and meaningful, not token or tick-box, consent. Rather 
than making the vain attempt to fully inform study participants, the aim should be to distribute 
knowledge and publicise undertakings. Only then can accountability be meaningful and trustworthiness 
be secured. In terms of the tension between privacy and openness, we need to reanimate the older 
principle of confidentiality by developing new technologies and institutional norms. By 
institutionalising norms of confidentiality and by creating clear, open, and accountable mechanisms to 
decide who has access to data and on what terms, it will be possible to satisfy seemingly opposed 
principles. Trust(worthiness) can be achieved by openness about what is done, including the ways in 
which privacy is respected, data is shared, and policies decided and upheld.  
3 The importance of consent, the terms of our proposals, and 
vindicating trust 
3.1 Consent matters 
Consent is the basis of voluntary cooperation. It is vital when people want to join with others in 
collaborative ventures but where compulsion would be inappropriate. Most of the data we want in 
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epidemiology can only be obtained if people willingly divulge it or readily submit to the necessary 
tests. Randomised clinical trials are, for the most part, only workable if subjects are willing to accept 
both the treatment under trial or some alternative.  
In such cases, consent serves two important purposes. First, it secures cooperation. Second, it helps to 
ensure that researchers are doing something that other people agree is worthwhile, and not merely a 
matter of their private interest. For consent to serve this second purpose, research subjects need to have 
a reasonable idea of what they are participating in. But it is not obvious that they need to be fully 
informed – indeed, it is clear that conveying full information is simply not possible. Moreover, note 
that information is no substitute for the trust that study participants must invest in researchers and their 
organisations. 
3.2 A conceptual point about consent 
Consent is always consent to a proposal. This has two key implications. First, every proposal always 
lays down some terms. It may be possible to negotiate these for some one-to-one forms of cooperation. 
But for multilateral forms of collaboration – especially any institutional form – certain rules must be 
laid down: ‘standard terms and conditions’ must apply. Detailed information about those terms is not 
necessarily helpful. If the terms are standard, then a prospective participant cannot pick and choose 
his/her way through the details. Nor can he/she foresee every contingency and what those terms will 
mean in practice. The decision is a simple one: participate or not, accept the terms or not. The person 
who agrees either accepts a risk – for example, that the detailed terms and conditions may go against 
his/her interests. Alternatively, he/she trusts that the terms show proper respect for his/her rights and 
interests – for example, if those terms have been worked out over many years by institutions that have a 
good track record of accountability and integrity. 
Second, however clearly those terms are spelled out and however much information a prospective 
participant is given in advance, the fact remains that he/she is relying on someone’s – or some 
institution’s – word. In fact, ‘information’ is not really the right word for most of the contents of 
‘informed consent’ materials, since these concern future actions: how the person will be treated and 
research aims will be pursued. At issue, then, are the undertakings that researchers and organisations 
are making to potential research subjects. Again, these persons need to invest trust to a greater or lesser 
extent. Greater detail is not necessarily helpful for this. In fact, such detail only helps in quite specific 
circumstances: where a prospective participant actually wants that information, and where he/she 
already trusts researchers to be truthful and to uphold the commitments that it contains. 
3.3 Trust 
When someone is asked to consent, then, the question facing him/her is not just about the nature of a 
proposal, as it is more or less explicitly described. It also matters whether the proposers are reliable and 
competent, whether their intentions are honourable, whether the underlying terms of the proposal are 
fair, and whether there are meaningful mechanisms to ensure reliability and accountability. In a word, 
are proposers and proposal trustworthy? 
In fact, researchers are in a good position to set reasonable terms for their proposals, and to ensure that 
those terms will be upheld. This is because the terms on which research is conducted with human 
subjects have been matters of consistent public discussion and institutional learning. Much energy has 
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gone into debates about what is fair and reasonable, and the ways in which research subjects’ trust can 
be abused. Many people – researchers, policy-makers, other professionals and lay persons – have been 
involved in those debates. Carefully worked-out institutional and legal mechanisms generally ensure 
that these terms are upheld in practice. And although there is still much work to do, as we stressed in 
our introduction, researchers are generally well-placed to offer openness – a commitment to tell people 
what they do and to publish what they find, opening their activities to scrutiny and accountability. By 
fortunate coincidence, such openness is a condition both of sound science and of institutional 
trustworthiness. 
In saying this, we do not mean to gloss over on-going problems. Commercial pressures, both within 
companies and in public institutions that are overly reliant on private funds, create systematic conflicts 
of interest and distort research in myriad ways (Elliott, 2010a; Lundh et al., 2012; Stamatakis et al., 
2013). Research on psychiatric medications remains an especial sore point (Safer, 2002; Healy, 2009; 
Elliott, 2010b). But these problems reinforce, rather than undermine, the wider point we want to make. 
Inevitably, individual research subjects must give consent, and invest trust, on the basis of limited 
information and future undertakings. Providing more information or making more detailed 
commitments does not automatically warrant trust, nor does it necessarily make consent more valid, 
nor help people understand the terms on which they are participating, nor guarantee that undertakings 
will be upheld. The point of informing is less ambitious: to give people a fair idea of ‘what they’re in 
for’. Doing this will always involve selecting relevant information, highlighting key undertakings, and 
framing these in particular ways. This is entirely justifiable insofar as research institutions have also 
undertaken a more fundamental task: to ensure that the terms of subjects’ participation are fair and that 
undertakings will be upheld. To achieve this, they need to distribute knowledge and create mechanisms 
of scrutiny and accountability that guarantee their commitments.  
3.4 Scrutiny and trustworthiness 
Achieving distributed knowledge is quite different from providing individual information, and has an 
important virtue that informing individuals does not. ‘Distributing’ means making information 
available to all those who have an interest in it. This involves different channels and levels of detail: 
information sheets, trial protocols, scientific publications, and much more. This enables different forms 
of scrutiny for different aspects of research: whether information is valid and aptly framed, whether the 
research project is well-conceived and likely to be useful, whether terms for participation are fair and 
reasonable, whether institutions are reliable and accountable. Many different actors can examine and 
criticise these aspects, in ways that no individual research subject ever could. 
In framing these points, we have assumed that consent is always necessary and possible. However, our 
arguments are compatible with claims that research may sometimes be undertaken without consent. 
Sometimes useful data or samples are already there, gathered for other purposes. If there is an 
important public interest and no risks to subjects, there may be arguments for using them without 
consent. For example, investigating potential adverse drug reactions after drug approval often relies on 
so-called secondary data. Here, we need extremely large, long-term, non-selective datasets in order to 
detect rare and/or late events. Informed consent requirements would lead to serious selection bias and 
inadequate sample sizes due to large numbers of non-responders. This in turn would hinder research 
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which might prevent thousands of avoidable deaths. It has for instance been estimated that during the 
five years Rofecoxib (Vioxx®) was on the market in the US around 88.000 to 140.000 myocardial 
infarcts occurred that could be attributed to this drug (Graham et al., 2005; see further Capron, 1991; 
Parker, 2005; Miller, 2008; Clayton, 2009; Rothstein and Shoben, 2013; Ioannidis, 2013). If non-
consensual research is to be defensible, broader openness and accountability must play an even greater 
role. 
Our broader point, however, is that to permit meaningful consent and to earn trust, there is no need for 
ever-more detailed forms, nor on-going communication with each research subject. Depending on the 
project, there may not even be a need for individual consent. What researchers must ensure, however, is 
that their proposals are trustworthy and reasonable. Trust needs to be informed by openness in a 
context of well-considered institutional mechanisms. Reasonableness is achieved by scrutiny and 
discussion in many different forums, and by learning from past and current difficulties.  
4 Privacy, confidentiality and data-sharing   
We have mentioned above that a key term of research proposals must be to uphold the interests of 
study participants. Apart from the side-effects of particular medical interventions, the biggest risks to 
study participants are generally those of the ‘information society’. By this we mean a society full of 
organisations that gather information about people and use it, not just to meet individuals’ needs and 
wants, but also to pursue their own purposes.  
Tim Kelsey, for a long time NHS England’s Director for Patients & Information, has claimed: “There 
has never been a case in Britain in which someone given access to anonymous patient information has 
used it to intrude into someone’s life – if such a case existed we would all know about it” (Kelsey, 
2009). Unfortunately, the last part of this statement is false. In all likelihood, people will not find out if, 
or when, or how, this has happened. Employment decisions are necessarily opaque: confidential 
information is needed to compare individual applicants, so it will be hard to know if (for example) 
health information has illicitly been drawn on. Pricing for individualised services such as credit or 
health insurance is determined by complex algorithms, in ways that barely permit scrutiny or challenge 
(Dwork and Mulligan, 2013).   
4.1 Confidentiality facilitates information-sharing 
Just as consent and openness enable cooperation, so too does confidentiality. It is natural to approach 
confidentiality simply as a prohibition on information sharing. But this is an unhelpful way of framing 
the principle: the collaborative nature of modern healthcare has made such a conception of 
confidentiality ‘decrepit’ (Siegler, 1982). In fact, norms of confidentiality enable information sharing 
(Manson and O’Neill 2007, p. 123-127; Richards and Solove, 2007). Most obviously, confidentiality 
enables patients to share information with health care professionals. Equally important, it also enables 
professionals to share this information more widely, subject to a crucial proviso. Professionals may 
only share information with specific persons for specific purposes; those persons must be subject to 
similar obligations and similar forms of accountability. In this way, confidentiality enables 
collaborative health care that relies on quite large numbers of people having access to relevant 
information. 
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In research contexts, just as in many health care contexts, it is crucial that information be shared. (And 
perhaps also samples of biological material which can be just as revealing about individuals.) 
Information always needs to be shared across a research team. Further, we have emphasised that data-
sharing must be institutionalised in order to ensure the integrity of research findings – notwithstanding 
the difficult practical questions that still need to be worked out for different fields and specialisms. So it 
is not possible to promise study participants that data will be ‘protected’ from other researchers; nor is 
there any merit in seeking consent for every act of data-sharing. What can be promised, however, is 
confidentiality. Understood as an enabling, and not merely restrictive, principle, confidentiality 
provides the basis on which data may be shared beyond the original team. 
4.2 Ways to uphold privacy 
Many readers will already be familiar with the sorts of detailed procedures and norms needed to protect 
data and assure confidentiality. Solutions must combine technological and physical safeguards with 
clear procedures and legal sanctions. Apart from good old lock and key, technologies need to involve 
privacy by design. Simple solutions have been tried and they have failed. As we already mentioned, 
‘anonymisation’ is not good enough, since research increasingly depends on rich, individual-level data 
that can be reidentified by so-called jigsaw attacks. But there is good reason to think that more 
sophisticated technologies can do the job, so long as they are designed hand-in-hand with institutional 
and legal norms. Those norms need to be specific, so that it is always clear who should have access to 
data on what terms. At the same time, they will need to be revisable in the light of new sorts of data, 
new possibilities for analysis, and legitimate extensions of original purposes. Hence research 
institutions must have proper mechanisms to review those policies. This also requires timely and 
useable channels for all interested parties to learn about – and perhaps to challenge – those procedures 
and decisions. Another difficult task is to ensure proper audit trails and monitoring alongside 
mechanisms of accountability and enforcement, including legal sanctions. These mechanisms should 
not operate as a barrier to those with legitimate claims to access, but they must have sufficient power to 
defeat temptations to make other uses of data. 
Acknowledging that ‘the devil is in the detail’ for all these issues, we wish to emphasise one general 
point: that openness is key. Individual-level data must remain in the hands of those who are obliged to 
use it only for specific, research purposes. To provide credible guarantees of this, however, policies and 
procedures for protecting and sharing data must be public matters. As organisations and technologies 
change, this openness is essential for critique, improvement and accountability – in a word, for 
trustworthiness. 
5  Conclusion 
Our question has been: what should confidentiality and consent look like on a wider view of research 
ethics? Our answer is that they should appear as principles that enable and uphold the research 
endeavour. They will appear this way providing they are set in a wider context of openness, oversight 
and accountability – a perspective that is both ethically and scientifically essential. 
‘Informed consent’ is not just about informing individuals so that they can offer agreement. It should 
be seen as part of a larger, public process where the terms of proposals are debated and agreed, 
information is distributed, trustworthiness created and trust warranted. Instead of striving for the 
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unrealistic goal of ‘fully informed consent’, we should ask what makes it reasonable for study 
participants to invest trust on the basis of limited information and commitments about future actions. 
Trust is informed, not by detailed information that each individual must digest, nor by detailed terms 
that may or may not be fulfilled, but by a broader context of institutional openness and accountability. 
Confidentiality, in turn, is not about keeping information private or secure, or about seeking consent 
every time data is shared. Instead, it means sharing information on very specific terms and with 
rigorous safeguards. If data is shared, it must be alongside duties to use it in particular ways and 
stringent mechanisms to ensure those duties are upheld. One of our starting points in this paper 
followed from recent debates about the quality and integrity of health-related research: the validity of 
research cannot be assured unless individual-level data is made available beyond the original research 
team. What needs to be developed, in order to uphold confidentiality and make such data-sharing 
legitimate, are technologies, platforms, guidelines and institutional provisions, backed up by 
meaningful sanctions.  
In neither case is there any reason to fear an irresolvable tension between opposed values. Instead, 
professional and institutional commitments to openness – the same values that are needed to uphold the 
scientific endeavour – can ensure that privacy and consent are meaningful, notwithstanding the limits 
to the information any individual study participant can digest and the need for data-sharing beyond the 
original research team. 
Let us close by reframing our argument. Our societies are engaged in an unprecedented experiment: 
powerful organisations, above all corporations and governments, are gathering more and more 
information about us. We have good reasons to fear that this may damage our interests, since their 
processes of data-gathering are so shadowy and unaccountable. In this paper we have suggested that 
scientific research is at a great advantage, by virtue of the scrutiny and accountability that must attend 
it. Openness is central to scientific ethics and to genuine scientific progress, just as it is important to 
ensuring that research subjects are involved on fair terms. So long as we can surmount some 
misinterpretations of research ethics – especially calls for over-informed consent and over-protected 
data – the fact is that health research is not subject to unfairly burdensome ethical requirements. 
Instead, it is placed in a position of deserved trust. As much as we should deplore the unaccountability 
of the bureaucracies involved in commercial and governmental data-harvesting, so should we welcome 
the consent and safeguards, the scrutiny and accountability, that ensure the integrity of scientific 
research. 
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